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Abstract
Epidemics of infectious disease can have deleterious effects on economic develop-
ment except mitigated through global health governance and domestic institutions.
We investigate this hypothesis by examining the effects of sudden exposure to menin-
gitis on economic outcomes using evidence from the meningitis belt in sub-Saharan
Africa. Meningitis shocks reduce economic activity and child health outcomes in peri-
ods when the World Health Organization (WHO) does not declare an epidemic year.
These effects are reversed when the WHO declares an epidemic year. A primary mech-
anism explaining the heterogeneity in results may be the influx of donor aid when the
WHO declares an epidemic year. We document an increase in World Bank health
aid projects approved during epidemic years. Areas that receive more health aid have
more economic activity though health projects funded during epidemic years are rated
relatively worse by independent evaluators. Domestic institutions influence resource
distribution, with regions that are co-ethnic with the president having better outcomes
than non-co-ethnic areas. The results are robust to extensive controls and using the
timing of the Islamic Hajj to instrument for meningitis shocks.
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1 Introduction
The ongoing coronavirus, COVID-19, pandemic has infected over 1 million people and re-
sulted in more than 50,000 deaths as of April 2020 (Lai et al., 2020). The virulence and
human cost of the epidemic, and recent ones like it in the past few decades, has reignited
discussions about the economic burden of infectious disease and the steps that can be taken
to mitigate their effects. With climate change expected to worsen the incidence of epidemics
of infectious disease, estimating the economic burden of disease and the potential role of
redistributive efforts to reduce the negative impacts of epidemics is a crucial policy ques-
tion. While previous research has investigated the economic burden of disease, what is less
well understood are the mechanisms that underlie the effects of epidemics on development
activity within countries. When countries are declared nationally epidemic by global health
governance organizations based on some threshold of cases, the influx of donor aid and re-
construction efforts following the epidemics may increase economic activity, with resultant
positive effects on development. Alternatively, if domestic politics exerts an influence, then
such reconstruction efforts may have multiplier effects in more politically favored areas and
vice versa. Our work provides key insights into these issues.
In this study, we ask two questions: (i) how do epidemics of infectious disease impact
economic activity and human capital development? And (ii) what roles, if any, do global
health governance and domestic institutions play in mitigating these impacts? Exploiting
quasi-random exposure to meningitis shocks and epidemic years in the African meningitis
belt, we assemble data on meningitis cases, epidemics, the flow of World Bank donor aid,
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economic activity and child health outcomes to investigate the effects of ostensibly redistribu-
tive institutions on the economic burden of epidemic disease. The meningitis belt consists
of about 23 countries in Africa, extending from Senegal to Ethiopia and making up over 700
million individuals, that are frequently exposed to meningitis epidemics as shown in Figure
1. The epidemic1 form of meningitis is caused by the bacterium Neisseria meningitidis and
is characterized by an infection of the meninges or the thin lining covering the brain and
spinal cord. Direct transmission is through contact with respiratory droplets or throat secre-
tions from infected individuals (LaForce et al., 2009; Garc´ıa-Pando et al., 2014). Infection is
associated with fevers, pain, reduced cognitive function, and in the worst cases, permanent
disability and long-term neurological damage and death. Young children and adolescents
are particularly at risk of infection and epidemics can be very costly for households, with
households in the belt spending up to 34% of per capita GDP on direct and indirect costs
stemming from meningitis epidemics (Colombini et al., 2009; Akweongo et al., 2013).
We exploit quasi-random variation in district level exposure to meningitis shocks and
exogenous variation in the announcement of an epidemic year to examine these effects using a
difference-in-differences framework. Our meningitis shock variable is constructed from a new
dataset, assembling mean weekly meningitis cases per 100,000 population for districts across
eight countries in the belt from 1986 to 2008. The shock variable is an indicator that equals
one if the z-score for meningitis is above a district’s long term mean, following the definition
of epidemics outlined by the World Health Organization (Organization, 2020)2. We verify the
validity of our design by showing that relevant institutional and geographic characteristics
are balanced across districts with higher versus lower likelihoods of experiencing meningitis
1Where epidemics are defined in the SSA context as greater than 100 cases per 100,000 population
nationally within a year by the World Health Organization (WHO) (LaForce et al., 2009).
2The World Health Organization defines an epidemic as “the occurrence in a community or region of
cases of an illness clearly in excess of normal expectancy. The number of cases indicating the presence of an
epidemic varies according to the agent, size, and type of population exposed, previous experience or lack of
exposure to the disease, and time and place of occurrence.” (Organization, 2020).
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shocks.
The results show that meningitis shocks or high, unexpected levels of meningitis signifi-
cantly reduce economic activity on average by 6.5% . The effect is nonlinear, with meningitis
shocks increasing economic activity during years declared by the World Health Organization
(WHO) as epidemic years and reducing economic activity during non-epidemic years. A
meningitis shock during a non-epidemic year decreases economic activity by up to 14.2%,
while the announcement of an epidemic year reverses the negative effect, increasing it by up
to 2.9%. We find similar results for child health outcomes, with unexpected, high meningitis
exposure during epidemic years reducing the incidence of stunting and underweight outcomes
in children born during the epidemic year. Children born in meningitis shock areas during
a year declared an epidemic year are 6.6 percentage points (pp) less underweight and 7.6 pp
less stunted than their non-epidemic year peers. Overall being born in a meningitis shock
district during an epidemic year reduces the current incidence of being underweight by 2.3
pp, versus an increase in the incidence of being underweight of up to 4.3 pp for children born
in meningitis shock districts in years not declared epidemic years. Similarly being born in
a meningitis shock district during an epidemic year reduces the current incidence of being
stunted by 3 pp, versus an increase in the incidence of being stunted of up to 4.6 pp for
children born in meningitis shock districts in years not declared epidemic years. We find
some evidence for crowd-out of routine vaccination during epidemic years. Children born
in meningitis shock districts during a declared epidemic year are less likely to get BCG
(tuberculosis) and polio vaccines.
As a robustness check, and to address potential bias concerns in the measurement of
our meningitis shock variable, we use an instrumental variables strategy. Motivated by work
from epidemiology and public health which links large gatherings of people at the Hajj,
a muslim pilgrimage to Mecca that all muslims are expected to undertake at least once
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during their lifetimes, to outbreaks of meningitis (Lingappa et al., 2003; Shafi et al., 2008;
Yezli et al., 2016); and a related literature in economics linking cultural practices to health
outcomes (Almond and Mazumder, 2011), we hypothesize that districts with large shares
of muslims who happen to be attending the Hajj at the beginning of a meningitis outbreak
cycle, may not experience meningitis shocks. The timing of the Hajj is quasi-random and
varies yearly according to the Islamic calendar. A combination of social distancing from
lowered numbers of people in districts around the Hajj at the beginning of an outbreak
cycle, and increased mandatory vaccination rates for Hajj travelers from the meningitis belt
at Mecca (Yezli et al., 2016) could significantly decrease infection rates over the course of
the cycle (Shafi et al., 2008). Following the predictions of the epidemiological literature, the
instrument uses (i) the share of the district that is muslim interacted with (ii) an indicator
that equals one if the Hajj happens to fall at the beginning of a meningitis cycle in a given
year3.
We show that our instrument robustly predicts the meningitis shock variable. Districts
with a larger share of muslims potentially departing for Hajj at the beginning of an epidemic
cycle have a lower likelihood of being meningitis shock areas. To address possible concerns
around the exclusion restriction, we conduct a number of falsification tests, including exam-
ining the direct effect of our instrument on our economic outcomes. The results show that
our instrument does not directly affect economic activity.
We show that a primary mechanism explaining the heterogeneity in results and the
reversal of the negative effect of meningitis shocks on economic activity and child health
outcomes during epidemic years is the influx of donor aid when the WHO declares an epi-
demic year, which may be enough to offset the negative income shock from increased direct
and indirect costs resulting from the epidemic. We document an increase in World Bank
3The beginning of the cycle in meningitis belt countries is January, with cases peaking in March or April
and receding in June. We discuss the epidemiology of the disease in further detail in Section 2.
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health aid projects approved and funded during epidemic years. The donor effect is re-
distributive, with funds flowing away from non-health to health sector projects. We find
evidence of imperfect targeting of World Bank health aid, due to relatively long approval
processes for projects. Areas that receive more health aid have more economic activity. Ad-
ditionally, health aid projects approved during an epidemic year are rated more poorly by
independent evaluators than non-epidemic year health projects.
What roles do domestic institutions play in mitigating the effects of epidemics? Re-
gions with unexpected high levels of meningitis but which share the same ethnicity as the
president have higher levels of economic activity and lower proportions of currently stunted
and underweight children born during the epidemic year than non-co-ethnic regions. The
results confirm trends in previous literature noting the importance of regional favoritism
in resource distribution under centralized political institutions (Burgess et al., 2015; Dick-
ens, 2018; Archibong, 2019). This suggests that an additional mechanism may be regional
favoritism in within-country resource distribution through domestic institutions. Greater
redistribution to co-ethnic affected areas may have multiplicative effects, magnifying and
more precisely targeting redistribution of health resources, beyond donor aid. The results
highlight the importance of redistributive policy and global and domestic governance around
health in mitigating the impacts of epidemics of infectious disease.
We add to several distinct literatures. First, our work is related to the economics
literature on the economic burden of infectious disease, and the effects of early life shocks on
human capital outcomes (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2007; Adhvaryu et al., 2016; Almond, 2006;
Bleakley, 2007; Bloom and Mahal, 1997; Oster, 2005; Jayachandran and Pande, 2017). These
studies show that infectious disease can affect a wide range of outcomes, including school
enrollment, performance and attainment (Bleakley, 2007; Archibong and Annan, 2017), and
labor market outcomes (Almond, 2006; Gould, Lavy, and Paserman, 2011; Bhalotra and
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Venkataramani, 2015), among others.
We also contribute to work in economics, political science and social epidemiology on
the role of redistributive institutions and domestic policy in managing the effects of epidemics
of infectious disease (Adda, 2016; Chigudu, 2020, 2019; Farmer, 1996, 2001; Geoffard and
Philipson, 1996; Krieger, 2001; Leach, Scoones, and Stirling, 2010; Philipson, 1999; Youde,
2017; Copeland et al., 2013). We expand these literatures by providing quantitative estimates
of the role of global and domestic redistributive institutions in managing the impacts of
epidemics of infectious disease. We also add to the literature on the importance of domestic
policy around social distancing in flattening epidemic curves and reducing the severity of
outbreaks (Copeland et al., 2013; Fenichel, 2013).
Our work also contributes to the economics literature on the role of donor aid in
development (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Easterly, 2006; Nunn and
Qian, 2014; Bra¨utigam and Knack, 2004). While a robust literature has found mixed results
on the benefits of foreign aid for development (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Moyo, 2009), a
more recent literature has noted that health aid may have positive impacts on human capital
outcomes particularly in asset constrained regions (Odokonyero et al., 2015; Kotsadam et al.,
2018; Gyimah-Brempong, 2015; Miguel and Kremer, 2004; Bandiera et al., 2019; Ndikumana
and Pickbourn, 2017). Our paper provides quantitative evidence of the barriers to targeting
donor aid and adds to the evidence of partial crowd-out that may occur, in areas like routine
vaccination, when donor aid increases in response to epidemics of infectious disease (Bloom,
Canning et al., 2004; Deserrano, Nansamba, and Qian, 2020; Aldashev, Marini, and Verdier,
2019). Finally, we add to the literature on regional and ethnic favoritism in the distribution
of resources (Alesina, Michalopoulos, and Papaioannou, 2016; Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly,
1999; Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi, 2015), and highlight the potential multiplier effects of
regional favoritism in domestic redistribution of health resources post an epidemic.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief background
on the epidemiology and costs of infectious disease, with a focus on meningitis epidemics.
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 outlines our empirical strategy and presents results on
the effects of meningitis epidemics on economic outcomes. Section 5 provides quantitative
estimates of the role of World Bank aid as a potential mechanism explaining the results.
Section 6 evaluates the role of domestic institutions and regional favoritism. Section 7
concludes.
2 Epidemics and the Epidemiology of Infectious Disease: Evi-
dence from the Meningitis Belt
The World Health Organization defines an epidemic as “the occurrence in a community
or region of cases of an illness clearly in excess of normal expectancy. The number of
cases indicating the presence of an epidemic varies according to the agent, size, and type of
population exposed, previous experience or lack of exposure to the disease, and time and
place of occurrence.” (Organization, 2020). Recent epidemics have had costly human capital
impacts including: the Ebola epidemic in West Africa, with cases concentrated in Guinea,
Liberia and Sierra Leone which resulted in an estimated4 28,600 cases and 11,325 deaths,
the 2015 Zika epidemic originating in Brazil and spreading through the Americas, the 2016
dengue epidemic worldwide which resulted in 100 million cases and 38,000 deaths, and most
recently, the, as of 2020 ongoing, coronavirus, COVID-19 pandemic, which originated in
China and has since spread worldwide resulting in over 1 million cases and more than 50,000
deaths as of April 2020 (Bloom and Cadarette, 2019; Lai et al., 2020).
Although a robust literature in social and economic epidemiology has investigated the
economic implications of an increased burden of infectious disease, relatively fewer studies
4Likely underestimated according to Bloom and Cadarette (2019).
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have examined the role of domestic and international health institutions in managing the ef-
fects of epidemics (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2007; Adda, 2016; Almond, 2006; Archibong and
Annan, 2017, 2019; Deaton, 2003; Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney, 2009). Social epidemi-
ologists in particular have emphasized the importance of ex-ante and ex-post redistributive
efforts in health in determining the economic effects of epidemic disease, with studies show-
ing that regions with better and more equitable ex-ante health infrastructure and more, and
more equitable distribution of ex-post funding may be able to better manage the effects of
epidemics of infectious disease (Farmer, 1996, 2001; Geoffard and Philipson, 1996; Chigudu,
2020; Leach, Scoones, and Stirling, 2010; Bloom, Canning et al., 2004).
A growing literature in economics has highlighted the potential role of targeted redis-
tribution of resources in alleviating the negative effects of infectious disease (Bleakley, 2007;
Bandiera et al., 2019; Adhvaryu, Fenske, and Nyshadham, 2019; Adda, 2016; Miguel and
Kremer, 2004). While previous studies have examined the impacts of health interventions in
targeted randomized control trial settings, there remains relatively little work investigating
the role of global health governance institutions in alleviating negative externalities from
epidemics of infectious disease (Youde, 2017). To contribute to closing these gaps in the
literature on the politics and economic burden of infectious disease, we investigate one of the
most virulent and understudied infectious diseases in the world, meningococcal meningitis
in the African meningitis belt.
2.1 The Meningitis Belt
Meningococcal meningitis is a disease so endemic in the sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region,
that an entire swathe of 23 countries from Senegal to Ethiopia, making up over 700 million
individuals, has been labelled the ‘meningitis belt’ due to frequent exposure to meningitis
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epidemics as shown in Figure 15. The epidemic6 form of the disease is caused by the bac-
terium Neisseria meningitidis and is characterized by an infection of the meninges or the thin
lining covering the brain and spinal cord. Infection is associated with fevers, pain, reduced
cognitive function, and in the worst cases, permanent disability and long-term neurological
damage and death. The WHO estimates that about 30,000 cases of the disease are reported
each year, with figures rising sharply in regions during epidemic years7.
The WHO also states that meningococcal meningitis can have high fatality rates, up
to 50% when left untreated8. Although vaccines have been introduced to combat the spread
of the disease since the first recorded cases in 1909 for SSA, effectiveness of the vaccines has
been limited due to the mutation and virulence tendencies of the bacterium (LaForce et al.,
2009)9. The periodicity of epidemics in the belt differs by country, with epidemic waves in
the meningitis belt occurring every 8 to 12 years on average by some estimates (Yaka et al.,
2008). Young children and adolescents are especially at risk of infection (Zunt et al., 2018).
The epidemiology of the disease is complex. Direct transmission is through contact
with respiratory droplets or throat secretions from infected individuals(LaForce et al., 2009;
Garc´ıa-Pando et al., 2014). The bacteria can be carried in the throat of healthy human
beings, and, for reasons not completely understood, subdue the body’s immune system,
5The WHO lists 26 countries in total as being at risk for meningitis epidemics, including Burundi, Rwanda
and Tanzania (Organization, 2018).
6Where epidemics are defined in the SSA context as greater than 100 cases per 100,000 population
nationally within a year by the World Health Organization (WHO) (LaForce et al., 2009).
7Source: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs141/en/
8http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs141/en/
9The most recent vaccine MenAfriVac has been available in meningitis belt countries since 2010 and has
been found to be effective against serogroup A, the strain of the bacterium most frequently associated with
epidemics in the belt (Karachaliou et al., 2015). There has been a reduction in serogroup A cases in many
countries since the introduction of the vaccine with the vaccine hailed as a success. Concerns have been
raised about waning herd immunity over the next decade especially if the vaccine does not become part of
routine childhood vaccinations; and an increase in serogroup C cases has been noted in other regions more
recently prompting concerns about more epidemics from other serogroups of the bacterium (Karachaliou
et al., 2015; Novak et al., 2019). There is currently no vaccine that prevents against all serogroups of
Neisseria meningitidis (Yezli et al., 2016).
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facilitating the spread of infection through the bloodstream to the brain following a 3 to 7
day incubation period (Basta et al., 2018; Organization, 2018)10.
Although epidemic incidence is often associated with higher wind speeds, dust concen-
trations and lower humidity and temperatures that come with the onset of the dry, Har-
mattan season in SSA, the mechanisms of transmission are not fully understood11 (LaForce
et al., 2009; Garc´ıa-Pando et al., 2014). The Harmattan season generally extends from Oc-
tober till March, with the harshest part of the season in the first few months from October
to December (Perez Garcia Pando et al., 2014). The epidemic curve, as shown in Figure 7,
generally follows a sinusoidal pattern in the meningitis belt; cases typically begin in the first
month of the year in the dry season in January, and peak around March, with the case load
declining rapidly with the onset of the rainy season in June (Lingani et al., 2015).
Documented data on health expenditure of countries in the meningitis belt show that
households spend a significant portion of their incomes on direct and indirect costs stemming
from meningitis epidemics (Colombini et al., 2009; Akweongo et al., 2013). In Burkina Faso,
Niger’s neighbor in the meningitis belt, households spent some $90 per meningitis case- 34%
of per capita GDP- in direct medical and indirect costs from meningitis infections during
the 2006-2007 epidemic (Colombini et al., 2009). In households affected by sequelae, costs
rose to as high as $154 per case. Costs were associated with direct medical expenses from
spending on prescriptions and medicines12 and indirect costs from loss of caregiver income
(up to 9 days of lost work), loss of infected person income (up to 21 days of lost work) and
missed school (12 days of missed school) (Colombini et al., 2009). Meningitis epidemics are
10The WHO estimates that between 10% and 20% of the population carries textitNeisseria meningitidis
in their throat at any given time, with carriage rate spiking in epidemic years (Organization, 2018).
11The season is characterized by hot, dry northeasterly trade winds blowing from the Sahara throughout
West Africa; dust particles carried by the Harmattan winds make the mucus membranes of the nose of the
region’s inhabitants more sensitive, allowing nasal and throat secretions to spread more easily and increasing
the risk of meningitis infection (Yaka et al., 2008).
12Vaccines and treatment are technically free during epidemics, however information asymmetry among
health care workers and shortages of medicines often raise the price of medication (Colombini et al., 2009).
11
a notable negative income shock to households in the belt.
2.1.1 Hajj and Meningitis Epidemics
Every year more than two million Muslims travel to one of the largest and most geographi-
cally and ethnically diverse mass gatherings in the world- Hajj (Ahmed, Arabi, and Memish,
2006; Memish, 2010). Hajj, the annual Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca, Kingdom of Saudi Ara-
bia, spans over a few days in the 12th month of the Islamic lunar calendar (Yezli et al.,
2016). Able-bodied adult Muslims who can afford to make Hajj are required to do so at
least once in a lifetime. Extended stays and mass gatherings associated with Hajj are a key
risk factor influencing outbreaks and transmission of infectious diseases including meningitis
(Yezli et al., 2016). To address this risk, authorities of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia de-
ploy a combination of traditional, and innovative disease surveillance, prevention and control
measures for Hajj.
For example, it is mandatory for all pilgrims to be vaccinated with the quadrivalent
meningococcal (ACYW) vaccine (Yezli et al., 2016). Additionally, antibiotic prophylaxis is
administered upon entry for pilgrims from countries in the meningitis belt (Algarni, Memish,
and Assiri, 2019). Compliance with these regulations is enforced by examining vaccination
documents at ports of entry to the Kingdom for all pilgrims. These mandatory measures
combined with social distancing from fewer number of people in origin countries with a high
share of Muslims who perform Hajj could significantly decrease the rate of infection over
the epidemic curve in origin countries if the Hajj, which varies from year to year according
to the Islamic calendar, happens to fall at the beginning of a meningitis outbreak cycle in
January.
The importance of social distancing- measures taken to reduce physical contact - in
reducing the transmission of infectious diseases has been determined to slow down the trans-
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mission of infectious diseases (Copeland et al., 2013). Scientists measure the intensity of an
infectious disease by its reproduction number (R0)-the expected number of cases generated
by one case- and assert that there is a direct, positive correlation between social interaction
and the reproduction number of an infectious disease (Zhang et al., 2020). In the context
of the present study, a high share of Muslims in districts in the meningitis belt likely to
perform Hajj coinciding with the beginning of an epidemic curve translates to lessened so-
cial interaction within those districts and a flattened epidemic curve, which then reduces
the likelihood of a district being a meningitis shock district in a given year. We construct a
novel instrument to test this hypothesis in Section 4.
3 Description of Data: Economic Activity, Child Health, Aid and
Regional Favoritism
We combine data from multiple sources for eight countries in the meningitis belt where data
on meningitis cases, economic activity and child human capital outcomes were available,
namely: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Niger and Togo, shown
in Figure 2. As of 2019, five (Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Togo) of these eight
countries are classified as low-income by the World Bank, while three (Nigeria, Ghana and
Cameroon) are classified as low-middle income countries. Estimates of health spending as
a share of GDP and the share of donor spending in health expenditure for study countries
relative to the Africa and world averages are shown in Figure 613.
Note that for the study countries, per capita health spending is relatively low at $47
on average, equivalent to 5% of per capita GDP and lower than both the Africa (5.6%) and
world (10%) averages. Government spending per capita on health is also quite low at $11
and equivalent to 1.1% of per capita GDP versus 1.3% for the Africa average and 7.4% for
13Estimates from 2016 data, the most recent complete dataset available.
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the world mean. Out of pocket spending on health is relatively high at around 50% of health
spending in study countries, and higher than the Africa average (36%) and the world average
(19%). Donor spending as a share of health expenditures is relatively high at 19%, similar to
the Africa average (20%)14. Further detail on the data is provided in the summary statistics
table in Table 1.
3.1 Meningitis Cases
We assemble district level records of mean weekly meningitis cases per 100,000 population
from the World Health Organization from 1986 to 2008 for countries in the meningitis belt
in SSA with available data as shown in Figure 215.
Epidemic years of meningitis are declared by the WHO in the sample when the national
average incidence of meningitis is above 100 cases per 100,000 population. Table 1 shows
that on average, there were 6 meningitis cases per 100,000 for the district/year in our study
sample, with significant variability both across and within countries and years as shown in
Figure 3. Following the WHO definition of epidemics as “cases of an illness clearly in excess
of normal expectancy”, we define a meningitis shock variable, as a measure of ‘outside of
normal expectancy” meningitis events at the district level. The meningitis shock variable is
an indicator that takes on a value equal to one if meningitis cases in a given year is above the
district’s standardized long-term mean. In other words, the meningitis shock variable equals
one if the z-score relative to the district’s long term mean of weekly meningitis cases per
100,000 population is greater than zero. The average share of districts classified as meningitis
shock districts is around 0.36 as shown in Table 1.
14Complete data on donor spending for the entire world sample is not available for the 2016 year.
15District level weekly cases of meningitis case per 100,000 population are available from 1995 to 1999 for
28 districts in Benin, 1996 to 1999 for 30 districts in Burkina Faso, 1997 to 1998 for 10 districts in Cameroon,
1996 to 1998 for 138 districts in Ghana, 1989 to 1998 for 80 districts in Mali, 1986 to 2008 for 34 districts in
Niger, 1995 to 1997 for 116 districts in Nigeria and 1990 to 1997 for 59 districts in Togo as shown in Figure
3. These make up a dataset of district level meningitis cases of 495 districts across the 8 countries.
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3.2 Night Lights
Following previous literature using night light density as a proxy for economic activity (Hen-
derson, Storeygard, and Weil, 2011; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013), we use data
on night light density from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program’s Operational Linescan System (DMSP-OLS) to
measure economic activity in the absence of detailed micro-level income estimates for the
study countries. Night light density data from the NOAA is available from 1992, and we use
data from 1992-2008 to match meningitis case data from our study region. Since a notable
fraction of the district level observations take on the value of zero, following previous litera-
ture, we use the log of night light density, adding a small number (ln (0.01+ LightDensity))
as our measure of night light density. The log transformation allows us to use all observations
and account for outliers in the luminosity data (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013).
3.3 Child Health
To examine the effects of epidemics on child health outcomes, we use geocoded data from
the birth recode (BR) of the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) for various years
for the 8 countries. The DHS data are nationally representative cross-sectional household
surveys that provide information on the demographic characteristics of individuals within
households. For the BR sample, women aged 15-49 are individually interviewed to gather
information on every child ever born to the woman. For each of the women interviewed, the
BR has one record for every birth16.
For births within the past five years at the time of each survey, the DHS data contains
16The BR of the DHS, including important geocoded information on the location of households or house-
hold clusters, is available for 1996, 2001 and 2012 for Benin; 1999, 2003 and 2010 DHS for Burkina Faso;
2004 and 2011 DHS for Cameroon; 1998, 2003, 2008 and 2014 DHS for Ghana; 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2012
DHS for Mali; 1992 and 1998 DHS for Niger; 2003, 2008 and 2013 for Nigeria; and 1998 and 2013 for Togo.
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information on child anthropometric outcomes including the weight for age z score (WFA
z) and height for age z score (HFA z), vaccinations, and mortality status - whether child is
alive or dead and age at death if dead. Combined with the district level meningitis cases,
this gives a dataset of nationally representative individual level data of births from 1992 to
2014 covering 14 DHS surveys across the 8 countries. The average infant mortality, or rate of
children who die within the year of birth, in the sample is 38%. The average WFA z and HFA
z are -1.54 and -1.47 respectively. In normal circumstances, regardless of spatial differences,
children in normal conditions should have similar anthropometric indicators (Habicht et al.,
1974).
The WFA z and HFA z reflect factors that may affect a child’s health in utero, at birth
and/or after birth. Higher values are generally associated with favorable health conditions
(Jayachandran and Pande, 2017). A child is considered underweight with a WFA z of less
than -2.0 while a child is considered stunted with a HFA z of less than -2.0. 38% of children
in the sample are underweight while 36% are stunted. Finally, we examine child vaccination
rates for routine vaccines as indicators of healthcare use. We collect available information on
BCG (tuberculosis), polio, DPT (diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus) and measles vaccination
as well as a total of all vaccinations. 61% and 42% percent of children in the sample received
BCG and measles vaccination respectively. Of the 3 doses of polio and DPT vaccinations
required, children received an average of 1.45 and 1.38 doses respectively. The average total
number of vaccines received by children in the sample was 3.83 out of a maximum of 8
vaccines as shown in Table 1. Note the recommended schedule for routine vaccination of
children by WHO standards is at birth for BCG and with the first dose at birth for Polio as
shown in Table 2, in contrast with DPT and measles which may be taken later after birth
(Organization, 2019).
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3.4 World Bank Aid Data
To examine the relationship between epidemics and global governance health interven-
tions/initiatives, we use geocoded data on World Bank funded projects by sectors from
AidData. This data contains the location and sectors of World Bank funded projects be-
tween 1995 and 2014 (AidData, 2017) as shown in Figure 5. Projects are classified by the
World Bank as belonging to up to 5 sectors, such as: health, central government administra-
tion, general public administration, other social services, railways, and roads and highways.
The amount (in 2011 USD) committed and disbursed for each project is also reported. A
subset of these projects is given an independent evaluation grade (IEG) or project outcome
rating based measuring the extent to which the major relevant objectives of the project were
achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently.
This rating is on a six-point scale ranging from highly unsatisfactory (1) to highly
satisfactory (6)17. We limit our sample to the subset of projects approved during between
1986 to 2008 to match the duration of our meningitis case data. Summary statistics in Table
1 show that while on average around $56 million is committed to projects approved during
our study years, only 12% of projects are health projects, where we define a project as being
in the health sector if any one of its 5 sector categories correspond to health. The average
committed for health projects is relatively lower at around $6 million per year. The average
duration of these projects is around 6 years, while their average IEG rating is 3.98, or around
4 or “moderately satisfactory”.
17In detail: “Highly Unsatisfactory”=“1”, “Unsatisfactory”=“2”, “Moderately Unsatisfactory”=“3”,
“Moderately Satisfactory”=“4”, “Satisfactory”=“5”, “Highly Satisfactory”=“6”.
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3.5 Regional Favoritism
To examine the role of regional favoritism in determining the distribution of resources follow-
ing an epidemic, we rely on the president’s recorded ethnic group to determine a president’s
ethnicity and data from the geo-referencing of ethnic groups (GREG) intersected with dis-
trict shapefiles to determine if any of the district’s population shares the ethnicity of the
president, following the recent literature emphasizing the importance of broad coalitions of
ethnic affiliations for redistribution of public goods and services from the center along ethnic
lines in Africa (Hodler and Raschky, 2014; Dickens, 2018). We present data and results from
Niger where we have the most complete data on the president’s ethnicity and origin here.
4 Estimating the Effects of Meningitis Epidemics on Economic
Activity and Child Health Outcomes
4.1 Intuition and Sources of Variation
The intuition for our identification strategy is straightforward. We exploit two sources of
variations: one is the variation created when countries are declared [nationally] epidemic
based on the aggregate distribution of meningitis cases “Epidemic Year” which is arguably
exogenous to observed district level realizations of meningitis, and the other is a “Meningitis
Shock” reflecting unusually high cases of meningitis at the district level. In practice, we
explore two constructions for “Meningitis Shock”: one reflecting the district-level meningitis
z scores –ie., district meningitis positive deviations from their long-run average, and the other
capturing district’s meningitis positive deviations from their long-run (moving) average. We
present the results from the z-score specification in the main text18. The intuition behind
defining meningitis shock in these ways, as stated earlier, follows the WHO definition of an
18The results from both constructions are qualitatively similar, and we present results from the long-run
average in the Appendix.
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epidemic, such that an individual district may be experiencing epidemic levels of meningitis
cases relative to its expectation, but the national average does not rise to the level that the
WHO chooses to declare a country-wide epidemic.
Our “Meningitis Shock” measures are also plausibly quasi-random for three reasons:
(i) there is significant variation in meningitis cases within country-districts, (ii) there are no
obvious trends in meningitis cases, and (iii) the “Meningitis Shock” measures are uncorrelated
with district-level observables as shown in the balance table estimates in Table 3. Together,
these suggest that our “Meningitis Shock” constructions are not picking up any endogenous
differences between districts; thus likely capturing exogenous variations from un-anticipated
exposure to meningitis outbreaks. We outline the model specification in Section 4.2. We
address potential concerns about the validity of the design in Section 4.3 and outline the
instrumental variables strategy in Section 4.4. .
4.2 Model Specification
We begin with a simple panel regression model linking changes in nightlights ydt -- our
measure of local economic development activity, to two sources of epidemic variations. For
other micro or household-level outcomes that we investigate, nightlights is replaced with
those outcomes accordingly, with outcomes measured at the individual child level i. We
estimate for district d in country c and (health) year t:
y(i)dct = αMeningitis Shockdct + βEpidemic Yearct + γMeningitis Shockdct ×Epidemic Yearct︸ ︷︷ ︸+µd + δct + dct
(1)
where “Meningitis Shock” is an indicator for a district’s positive deviations from its
long-run average of mean weekly meningitis cases per 100,000 population. “Epidemic Year”
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is an indicator for whether the WHO declares an epidemic year in a particular country. This
specification includes a set of unrestricted within-country district dummies, denoted by µd,
which capture unobserved differences that are fixed across districts. The country-year fixed
effects, δct control for aggregate changes that are common across countries over time, e.g.
aggregate prices, and national policies. In model specifications with current child health as
the outcomes, we also include year of birth fixed effects to account for potential life cycle
changes across cohorts.
Our key parameter of interest γ is identified by district-level variation in “Meningitis
Shock” and variation from whether or not the WHO declares a nation c’s year t as epidemic.
This provides an estimate of the “epidemic effect”: how meningitis epidemics and the global
and national response affect economic activity and is identified based on standard assump-
tions in a difference-in-differences model. Errors are clustered at the district level to allow
for arbitrary correlations.
Next, to assess the potential role of ethnic favoritism and its allocative effects on
meningitis epidemics, we modify the baseline model to include an interaction for whether or
not the president hails from an ethnic group of district d, “Same Ethnicity”:
y(i)dt = αMeningitis Shockdt + βSame Ethnicitydt + γMeningitis Shockdt × Same Ethnicitydt︸ ︷︷ ︸+µd + δt + dt
(2)
In practice, we define “Same Ethnicity” as a simple indicator of districts that contain a
non-zero share of people who share the same ethnicity as the president in year t, following the
recent literature on ethnic favoritism (Hodler and Raschky, 2014; Dickens, 2018). We restrict
our analysis for ethnic favoritism and meningitis allocation to only Niger: we have complete
reliable data on presidents’ ethnicity only in Niger; ethnicity data for other countries in our
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sample is sparse and incomplete.
4.3 Balance and Validity of Design
The difference-in-differences strategy outlined in Equation 1 and Equation 2 requires one im-
portant identifying assumption; that all relevant factors before epidemic years varied evenly
between meningitis shock and non-meningitis shock districts. This assumption is needed to
ensure that, ex-ante, pre-epidemic exposure, individuals located in meningitis shock districts
are an appropriate counterfactual for those located in unaffected districts. To evaluate the
plausibility of the first assumption, we estimate simple regressions of the likelihood of being
a meningitis shock district, measured as our meningitis shock variable averaged over the
years of available data for each district in each country, on a number of geographic and
institutional characteristics for each district following the below specification:
ydc = α+ ξMdc + δc + dc (3)
where Mdc is district d’s likelihood of being a meningitis shock district over the study
period. We consider various outcomes, ydc, spanning geographic and institutional fea-
tures, following previous literature on the relevance of these characteristics for development
(Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013; Archibong, 2019). The results in Table 3 show no
observable differences in outcomes across districts that experienced more meningitis shocks
between 1986 and 2008 and those that did not.
4.4 Instrumental Variables Strategy
As a robustness check, and to address potential bias in the measurement of our meningitis
shock variable, we use an instrumental variables strategy. If the meningitis case survey data
underlying the shock variable is measured with error, for instance, because of discrepancies
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in reporting functionality at health facilities providing data to the WHO during shock years,
this may bias our estimates of the effects of meningitis shocks on economic outcomes. If, for
instance, reporting capability is negatively impacted during shock years, then our estimates
may be biased downward, and the results from the OLS could be underestimating the effects
of meningitis shocks on economic activity. Motivated by work from epidemiology and public
health which links large gatherings of people at the Hajj to outbreaks of meningitis (Lingappa
et al., 2003; Shafi et al., 2008; Yezli et al., 2016); and a related literature in economics linking
cultural practices to health outcomes (Almond and Mazumder, 2011), we hypothesize that
districts with large shares of muslims who happen to be attending the Hajj at the beginning
of a meningitis outbreak cycle, may not experience meningitis shocks.
The timing of the Hajj is quasi-random and varies yearly according to the Islamic
calendar19. A combination of social distancing from lowered numbers of people in districts
around the Hajj at the beginning of an outbreak cycle, and increased mandatory vaccination
rates for Hajj travelers from the meningitis belt at Mecca (Yezli et al., 2016) could signifi-
cantly decrease infection rates over the course of the cycle (Shafi et al., 2008). Following the
predictions of the epidemiological literature, the instrument uses (i) the share of the district
that is muslim interacted with (ii) an indicator that equals one if the Hajj happens to fall at
the beginning of a meningitis cycle in January in a given year.
4.5 Results for Night Light Density
Figure 8 shows a snapshot of our economic activity results, with log night light density
higher in meningitis shock districts during a declared epidemic year, while the results for
night lights and our child health outcomes are summarized in Figure 9.
Table 4 reports estimates from Equation 1 with the night light density outcome. On
19A list of Hajj months over our meningitis survey years is in Table A6.
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average, meningitis shocks reduce economic activity, as measured by night light density, by
6.5% as shown in column (1). The effect is nonlinear, as shown in the fully specified model
in column (4), where high levels of meningitis shocks increase economic activity by around
17.1% in epidemic years and reduce economic activity by 14.2% in non-epidemic years. The
effect of meningitis shocks during epidemic years is effectively reversed, with an increase in
economic activity of up to 2.9% in meningitis shock districts during declared epidemic years.
The results are striking, in that though the average effect of meningitis shocks is neg-
ative, there is significant heterogeneity in the effects of these disease shocks depending on
whether or not the WHO declares an epidemic year. Given the high share of health expen-
diture sourced from donor aid in the majority of the study countries as shown in Table 6, a
major mechanism explaining this result is an influx of donor aid when the WHO declares an
epidemic year. Two potential mechanisms that may explain these results are (i) when the
WHO declares an epidemic year, there is an influx of donor aid, which may boost investments
in health and other infrastructure, leading to an increase, overall in economic activity, despite
health costs associated with treating epidemics; and (ii) Following the regional/ethnic fa-
voritism literature, presidents are more likely to redistribute domestic resources to co-ethnic
areas, particularly during non-epidemic years, when no outside investments/donor aid is
increased following an epidemic year designation.
4.6 Results for Child Health Outcomes
Table 5 reports estimates for the current HFA z and WFA z outcomes along with estimates
of infant mortality and current stunting and underweight outcomes. While there is no
significant effect of the interaction for meningitis shock and the epidemic year for infant
mortality, children born in meningitis shock districts during an epidemic year are taller
(column 2) and weigh more (column 4) than their peers born into meningitis shock but
non-epidemic year districts. Children born in high meningitis, meningitis shock areas during
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a year declared an epidemic year are 6.6 percentage points less underweight, 7.6 pp less
stunted than their meningitis shock, non-epidemic year peers. Overall being born in a high
meningitis/meningitis shock district during an epidemic year reduces the current incidence
of being underweight by 2.3 pp, versus an increase in the incidence of being underweight
of up to 4.3 pp for children born in high meningitis shock districts in years not declared
epidemic years.
Similarly being born in a high meningitis/meningitis shock district during an epidemic
year reduces the current incidence of being stunted by 3 pp, versus an increase in the incidence
of being stunted of up to 4.6 pp for children born in high meningitis shock districts in years
not declared epidemic years. The results here shed light on the medium to long-run impacts
of the WHO declaration of an epidemic year, with a potential mechanism being, as mentioned
previously, an influx of donor health aid post the announcement of an epidemic year.
Table 6 reports estimates for child current immunization outcomes, classified by immu-
nizations recommended at birth (BCG, polio) versus immunizations recommended sometime
after birth (DPT, measles) as mentioned previously and reported in Figure 2. The results
here are quite different to the earlier results on positive reversals for health in meningitis
shock districts during the epidemic year. For child routine vaccination, the results show
significant negative effects of meningitis shock on BCG and the number of polio doses (at
birth) vaccinations, with the signs negative but not significant for DPT and measles or non-
at birth vaccinations. Here, routine vaccination for BCG is up to 4.7 pp higher for children
born in meningitis shock districts during non-epidemic years and, overall, 2.1 pp lower for
children born in meningitis shock districts in declared epidemic years. A similar significant
pattern is shown for the polio vaccine in column 2 as well. One potential explanation for
these patterns is, following the donor aid literature that suggests that health aid from donor
agencies in response to epidemics/during epidemic years, may crowd-out routine vaccination,
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that there is crowd-out of routine vaccines in years declared epidemic years. The effect is
then particularly strong for vaccines that should be administered at or close to the time of
birth20 (Deserrano, Nansamba, and Qian, 2020; Boone, 1996; Bra¨utigam and Knack, 2004).
4.7 Instrumental Variable Estimates: Night Light Density
The results presented in Table 4 to Table 6 suggest that meningitis shocks have nonlinear
effects on economic outcomes, reducing economic activity in non-epidemic years and vice
versa. As discussed in Section 4.4, the OLS estimates of the effect of meningitis shocks
on economic activity may be biased if there is some measurement error in our meningitis
shock variable. To address this concern, we present results using an instrumental variables
strategy. A plausible instrument will predict exposure to meningitis shocks but will not
affect economic activity, except through the meningitis shock measure.
Following the research in epidemiology and public health on the role of the Islamic Hajj
in meningitis outbreaks outlined in Section 2.1.1, we construct an instrument that is the
interaction between two components: (i) the share of the district that is muslim interacted
with (ii) an indicator that equals one if the Hajj happens to fall at the beginning of the
meningitis cycle in January in a given year.
The share of the district that is muslim is based on mothers’ responses to the religion
question in DHS women’s sample and is averaged over all years for each district. Although
sampling is not based on religion, the muslim share is stable across individual survey years,
with correlation coefficients ranging from 0.65 to 0.98 (p < .001) across study countries21.
The intuition here, from the epidemiological literature, is that since the timing of the Hajj is
quasi-random and varies yearly according to the Islamic calendar, districts with large shares
20Which is why we would expect to see no effects for measles, for example, which should be administered
at 9 months.
21Correlations are based on the two most recent years of data for each country, to alleviate concerns of
fewer observations in earlier years.
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of muslims who happen to be attending the Hajj at the beginning of a meningitis outbreak
cycle, may not experience meningitis shocks. A combination of social distancing from lower
numbers of people in districts around the Hajj at the beginning of an outbreak cycle, and
increased mandatory vaccination rates for Hajj travelers from the meningitis belt at Mecca
(Yezli et al., 2016) could significantly decrease infection rates over the course of the cycle
(Shafi et al., 2008).
Panel A of Table 8 presents the first stage estimates for the Share Muslim x Hajj inter-
action instrument. The instrument significantly predicts meningitis shocks, with an F-stat
greater than 10 in all specifications. Panel B of Table 8 presents the second stage estimates
for night light density as the dependent variable22. The IV results qualitatively support the
OLS results for night light density. Meningitis shocks increase night light density by 10.5%
in declared epidemic years in the IV specification in Column (3) of Panel B versus a 62%
decrease in economic activity in non-epidemic years. The corresponding OLS estimates are a
2.9% increase in epidemic years versus a 14.2% decrease in economic activity in non-epidemic
years. The difference in the magnitude of the IV estimates could suggest measurement er-
ror in the meningitis shock variable, where the shock indicator is an imperfect proxy for
unexpected exposure to high levels of meningitis in our sample.
5 The Role of Health Aid: Evidence from World Bank Projects
One key mechanism that may explain both the positive reversal in economic activity and
child health outcomes and the crowd-out of routine vaccination results in Section 4.6 is an
inflow of donor aid post the announcement of an epidemic year. To investigate this hypothesis
we use aid data from World Bank projects as described in Section 3.4. We first estimate the
22Since the only years in the sample for which Hajj falls in January at the beginning of the outbreak
cycle are 2005 and 2006 as shown in Table A6, we are unable to estimate child health outcomes with the
instrument. There are no countries in the sample which have both complete meningitis data and DHS data
on children born in Hajj years.
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models in Equation 1 using World Bank aid data as our outcomes of interest. Then as a
robustness check, we perform heterogeneity analysis using the share of world bank aid and
using economic activity as our outcome variable to see if shock districts that get more World
Bank aid have more economic activity than their non aid recipient counterparts.
5.1 How World Bank Projects are Approved and Funded
To understand the results, it is important to understand how World Bank projects are
funded. We spoke to numerous officials and employees at the World Bank to get insight on
how World Bank aid projects are approved and funded. Our research revealed that projects
take relatively long times to be approved, with estimates of an average of 7-12 months to
approve a single project. Projects must go through ‘concept approval, final design approval,
then final package to Board’ before possibly being approved and funded. The shortest
amount of time to approve projects in an ‘emergency’ setting is reported to be around 3 to
4 months. A snapshot of the World Bank project approval process is provided in Figure 10.
What this means is that locations for World Health projects are chosen ex-ante relative
to the declaration of an epidemic year, and can be quite sticky and difficult to target specific
areas ex-post23 (O¨hler et al., 2017). This affects the targeting of health aid, given the
relatively small amount of health aid projects funded in the sample (12%), where officials
are not able to perfectly target health aid to districts or areas that may be most in need
during an epidemic year.
23O¨hler et al. (2017) provide suggestive evidence that projects are targeted geographically by population
share, with more populous regions receiving more projects, rather than by poverty status.
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5.2 Results: Health Project and Non Health Funding in Epidemic vs Non-
Epidemic Years
Table 9 reports the first set of estimates showing the impacts of meningitis shocks in epidemic
and non-epidemic years on the share of World Bank health aid projects approved and funded.
In column (1), when an epidemic year is declared, there is a significant increase, up to 82
pp, in health projects approved in that year. Column (4) shows that there is no significant
difference in health projects approved to meningitis shock vs non shock districts, which may
be explained by the inability to target issues discussed in Section 5.1.
While there is an increase in total dollars committed and disbursed to health projects
during epidemic years, as shown in Table 10, the effect does not significantly differ between
meningitis shock and non-meningitis shock districts, suggesting lack of targeting, as men-
tioned previously. Also note that the results suggest a redistribution of aid funds from
non-health to health projects, with positive, significant signs in epidemic years for the total
amount of funds committed and disbursed to health projects, and negative signs on amounts
going to non-health projects. Lastly, Table 11 shows a decrease in the independent evaluator
rating (IEG) of projects started during the epidemic year (column (2)). Health projects
started during the epidemic year are rated worse than their non-epidemic year counterparts
as shown in column (3).
As a robustness check in Table 12, meningitis shock districts that receive a greater share
of health aid projects approved in the year and more health aid committed and disbursed
see an increase in their economic activity as measured by night light density as shown in
columns (1)-(3). The effect is driven by health specific aid not general/total aid as shown in
columns (4) and (5).
Though there is no publicly available data on the details of the projects approved
28
over the study period, the dataset includes project titles that provide suggestive evidence
on the kinds of health and non-health projects being funded in epidemic vs non epidemic
years. A snapshot of the top 5 titles in each period is provided in Figure 11. Notable is the
difference between the epidemic and non epidemic year health project titles funded. During
the epidemic year the top health project titles are ‘health sector and development program’
and ’Economic recovery and adjustment credit (ERAC) project’, while during non-epidemic
years, the top project titles are ‘Community acton program’, ‘social fund’ and ’health, fertility
and nutrition project’, providing strong suggestive evidence of the responsiveness of World
bank donor health aid to epidemic year announcements.
6 Domestic Institutions: Regional Favoritism and Epidemics
6.1 Within Niger Evidence
To explore the role of domestic institutions on redistribution efforts in response to epidemics
of infectious disease, we use data on the ethnic match between the president and a district.
Following the regional favoritism literature, we test the hypothesis, that regions that share
an ethnicity or are co-ethnic with the president, have better economic outcomes than non-co-
ethnic districts possibly due to redistribution of resources toward co-ethnic districts (Alesina,
Baqir, and Easterly, 1999; Alesina, Michalopoulos, and Papaioannou, 2016; Dickens, 2018;
Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi, 2015; Hodler and Raschky, 2014). Given previous literature
on the increased salience of redistributive tension among groups for more asset constrained
entities, we focus on the poorest country for which we have the most complete data on
meningitis and ethnicity in our sample, Niger (Archibong and Annan, 2017, 2019).
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6.2 Regional Favoritism Results
We estimate the model from Equation 2, and document results for the impacts of meningitis
shock on economic activity in epidemic vs non-epidemic years and co-ethnic vs non-coethnic
districts in Table 13. On average, meningitis shocks, reduce economic activity, as measured
by night light density, by 8.5%. The effect is nonlinear, as shown in column (3), where
meningitis shocks increase economic activity by around 6% in epidemic years and reduce
economic activity by 17% in non-epidemic years. There is also heterogeneity in the effect
of meningitis shocks on economic activity by whether or not the president shares the same
ethnicity as the district in a given year as shown in column (5). Districts with which the
president shares the same ethnicity, experience a smaller decrease in economic activity when
there are high levels of meningitis shocks than non-co-ethnic districts. Column (6) shows the
combined effect of having high levels of meningitis shocks in an epidemic year, if a district
is co-ethnic with the president- an increase of up to 11% in economic activity.
Table 14 shows the split sample results by epidemic year for economic activity. The
effect of being co-ethnic with the president on economic activity is positive in epidemic and
non-epidemic years, and significantly positive in non-epidemic years, suggesting that even in
the absence of external donor aid, the executive branch attempts to invest its resources in
co-ethnic areas that are hardest hit by high unexpected levels of meningitis24.
The split sample results for child health outcomes in Table 15 are similar to the eco-
nomic activity results, though the effect of co-ethnicity on reducing infant mortality, and
current underweight and stunting incidence is only significant during epidemic years. This
result is consistent with a lack of health aid or influx of health funding in response to menin-
gitis shocks outside of an epidemic year. Interestingly, there is no crowd-out during epidemic
years for meningitis shock areas that are co-ethnic with the president as shown in Table 16,
24The sign is not significant in the epidemic year split sample possibly due to low sample size and power.
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suggesting even greater redistribution to those areas may be occurring during the epidemic
year, beyond the magnitude suggested by donor aid discussed in Section 5.
7 Conclusions
Recent scientific literature have provided evidence that future warming and climate change
may significantly increase the incidence and alter the geographical distribution of epidemics
of infectious disease. This may have potentially devastating consequences for global welfare,
absent effective redistributive institutions aimed at improving human capital outcomes.
An important contribution of our paper is to provide quantitative estimates of the
effects of epidemics of infectious disease on economic and human capital outcomes. We
examine the role of donor aid in determining the distribution of resources following the
announcement of an epidemic year. We find that high, unexpected levels of meningitis
significantly reduce economic activity on average. The effect is nonlinear, with meningitis
shocks increasing economic activity during years declared by the World Health Organization
as epidemic years and reducing economic activity during non-epidemic years. A meningitis
shock during a non-epidemic year decreases economic activity, while the announcement of an
epidemic year reverses the negative effect. We find similar results for child health outcomes,
with unexpected, high meningitis exposure during declared epidemic years reducing the
incidence of stunting and underweight outcomes for children born during the epidemic year.
Children born in meningitis shock areas during a year declared an epidemic year are less
underweight and less stunted than their non-epidemic year peers.
The results are robust to extensive controls and instrumenting for meningitis shock
using the timing of the Hajj which provides quasi-random variation in social distancing
measures essential for flattening epidemic curves. The Hajj strongly predicts meningitis
shock districts in areas with high shares of muslim population and reduces the likelihood of
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a district experiencing a meningitis shock.
We show that a primary mechanism explaining the heterogeneity in results and the
reversal of the negative effect of meningitis shocks on economic activity and child health
outcomes during epidemic years is an influx of donor aid when the WHO declares an epidemic
year, which may be enough to offset the decline from increased direct and indirect costs
resulting from the epidemic. We document an increase in World Bank health aid projects
approved and funded during epidemic years. The donor effect is redistributive, with funds
flowing away from non-health to health sector projects. Areas that receive more health aid
have more economic activity. Regions with unexpected, high levels of meningitis but which
share the same ethnicity as the president have higher levels of economic activity, and better
child health outcomes, suggesting that another mechanism may be regional favoritism in
resource distribution. The results highlight the importance of global governance around
health and domestic redistributive policy in mitigating the negative impacts of epidemics of
infectious disease on economic outcomes.
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Figure 1: Countries in the African Meningitis Belt
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Figure 2: Countries and districts in study region
Figure 3: Mean weekly meningitis cases per district over study region, with epidemic years
specified in brackets
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Figure 4: Spatial distribution of meningitis shock over study districts for selected years,
1986-2008
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Figure 5: Locations of World Bank aid projects for countries and districts in study region
over study years
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Figure 6: Health spending statistics across regions, 2016. Source: World Bank
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Figure 7: Meningitis Epidemic Curves (Niger)
Figure 8: Stochastic dominance: Log night light density is higher in meningitis shock districts
during declared epidemic year (EY). Lower in non-epidemic years
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Table 1: Summary Statistics, Africa
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
District Level Night Light Data
Meningitis Shock (Z) 1,141 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
Meningitis Cases (/100,000) 1,220 6.35 13.34 0.00 145.19
Epidemic Year 1,329 0.39 0.49 0 1
Log Night Light Density 1,329 −2.74 1.71 −4.61 3.98
Share Muslim 1,302 0.75 0.36 0.00 1.00
Share Muslim x Hajj 1,302 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
DHS Child Level Data
Infant Mortality 16,486 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00
WFA z 17,401 −1.54 1.33 −5.99 5.72
HFA z 17,401 −1.47 1.63 −6.00 5.89
Underweight 17,401 0.38 0.48 0.00 1.00
Stunted 17,401 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
BCG 22,401 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00
Nos. Polio 22,422 1.45 1.31 0.00 3.00
Nos. DPT 22,323 1.38 1.34 0.00 3.00
Measles 21,979 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00
Nos. Total Vacc. 21,806 3.83 3.33 0.00 8.00
World Bank Project Level Data
Health Project 556 0.12 0.33 0 1
Comm. Total, USD 556 55,657,922 28,851,034 5,302,687 238,620,908
Comm. Health, USD 556 6,068,739 17,204,611 0 68,215,861
Comm. Non-Health, USD 556 49,589,183 33,754,342 0 238,620,908
Disb. Total, USD 547 47,585,463 26,440,235 1,987,862 310,653,294
Disb. Health, USD 547 5,503,057 15,818,254 0 61,602,090
Disb. Non-Health, USD 547 42,082,406 30,213,919 0 310,653,294
IEG Outcome 301 3.98 1.24 1.00 6.00
Niger District Ethnicity Data
Same President Ethnicity 578 0.38 0.49 0 1
Table 2: WHO recommended vaccination schedule
Vaccine Diseases Age
1 BCG tuberculosis at birth
2 Polio (OPV) polio at birth, 6, 10, 14 weeks
3 DPT diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus 6, 10, 14 weeks
4 Measles measles 9 months
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Table 3: Balance on geographic and institutional characteristics
Panel A: Geographic Characteristics
Malaria Land Suitability Elevation Access to Rivers Distance to Sea Coast Distance to Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Meningitis shock average −1.680 −0.007 18.696 −0.077 −22.516 −19.465
(3.214) (0.081) (51.375) (0.339) (57.331) (131.928)
Mean of outcome 22.204 0.325 374.821 0.467 128.404 404.695
Observations 242 239 242 242 242 242
R2 0.576 0.503 0.554 0.094 0.322 0.250
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Geographic and Institutional Characteristics
Share Muslim Pastoral Centralization Index Centralization Dummy Diamond Petrol
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Meningitis shock average −0.218 −0.025 −1.182 −0.419 0.009 0.002
(0.149) (0.052) (0.867) (0.437) (0.100) (0.007)
Mean of outcome 0.688 0.026 1.288 0.721 0.012 0.004
Observations 236 764 768 768 242 242
R2 0.536 0.191 0.078 0.055 0.092 0.025
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses. Observations at the district level in all specifications except Panel B for the centralization and
pastoral outcomes, where observations are districts intersected with Murdock ethnicity regions. ‘Meningitis shock average’ is the likelihood that a district is a meningitis shock district over the period
of study. Land suitability is land suitability for agriculture from FAO data. Elevation is mean elevation in km from the Global Climate database. Distance to capital and seacoast in km. Malaria
stability is from the malaria ecology index from Kiszewski et al. (2004). Share muslim is based on DHS data. Access to River is an indicator for whether or not a district has a river running through
it. Centralization index is the level of precolonial centralization from Murdock ethnicity data (Murdock, 1967) and Centralization dummy is an indicator that equals 1 if the index is greater than 0
(following Archibong (2019)). Pastoralism dummy equals 1 if pastoralism was primary contributor to livelihood in precolonial ethnic region from Murdock data. Petrol and diamond are indicators
equal to 1 if the district has recorded deposits of petroleum and diamonds respectively from the PRIO dataset. ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗Significant at
the 10 percent level.
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Figure 9: More economic activity, Less stunting and underweight children currently, if born
in high meningitis shock districts but year was declared an epidemic year. In high shock,
non epidemic year districts, lowered economic activity, and more stunting and underweight.
Potential crowd-out of routine vaccines during epidemic years
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Table 4: Effect of meningitis shock on economic activity in epidemic vs non-epidemic years
Log Night Light Density
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Meningitis shock −0.065∗ −0.065∗ −0.142∗∗ −0.142∗∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.064) (0.064)
Epidemic year −0.827∗∗∗ −0.916∗∗∗ 0.158
(0.081) (0.083) (0.098)
Meningitis shock
x Epidemic year 0.171∗∗ 0.171∗∗
(0.082) (0.082)
Mean of outcome -2.741 -2.741 -2.741 -2.741
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x year FE Yes Yes Yes No
Linear time trends No No No Yes
Observations 1,141 1,141 1,141 1,141
Notes: Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by district. Dependent variables are
log night light density described in text from 8 African countries from 1992 to 2008. Meningitis shock is Z score indicator
based on district level mean as described in text. Linear time trends are country specific time trends. ∗∗∗Significant at the
1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 5: Effect of meningitis shock on child current weight and height outcomes in epidemic vs non-epidemic years
WFA z Underweight HFA z Stunted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Meningitis shock −0.176∗∗ −0.175∗∗ 0.043∗ 0.042∗ −0.178∗∗ −0.174∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.045∗∗
(0.081) (0.081) (0.022) (0.022) (0.079) (0.079) (0.020) (0.020)
Epidemic year −0.217∗∗ −0.213∗∗ 0.061∗ 0.059 −0.543∗∗∗ −0.534∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.101) (0.036) (0.036) (0.126) (0.128) (0.037) (0.037)
Meningitis shock
x Epidemic year 0.288∗∗ 0.281∗∗ −0.066∗ −0.064∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗ −0.076∗∗ −0.073∗∗
(0.119) (0.119) (0.036) (0.036) (0.114) (0.114) (0.034) (0.034)
Mean of outcome −1.583 −1.583 0.388 0.388 −1.476 −1.476 0.362 0.362
Mother’s controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x year FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Linear time trends No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 15,032 15,032 15,032 15,032 15,032 15,032 15,032 15,032
Notes: Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by district. Dependent variables are child outcomes described in text from 8 African countries.
Mother’s controls include mother’s age at birth and level of education. Meningitis shock is Z score indicator based on district level mean as described in text. Linear time trends are
country specific time trends. ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 6: Effect of meningitis shock on at birth (bcg, polio) vs non-at birth recommended (dpt, measles) child vaccinations
BCG Nos. Polio DPT Measles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Meningitis shock 0.047∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.120∗∗ 0.118∗ 0.118∗ 0.117∗ 0.014 0.013
(0.018) (0.018) (0.060) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.037) (0.037)
Epidemic year 0.048∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.161∗∗ 0.145 0.142 0.113∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.075) (0.076) (0.091) (0.091) (0.041) (0.041)
Meningitis shock
x Epidemic year −0.068∗∗ −0.068∗∗ −0.198∗∗ −0.194∗∗ −0.167 −0.162 −0.024 −0.024
(0.027) (0.027) (0.094) (0.094) (0.103) (0.104) (0.052)) (0.052)
Mean of outcome 0.591 0.591 1.375 1.375 1.328 1.328 0.406 0.406
Mother’s controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x year FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Linear time trends No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 19,581 19,581 19,606 19,606 19,548 19,548 19,258 19,258
Notes: Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by district. Dependent variables are child outcomes described in text from 8 African countries.
Mother’s controls include mother’s age at birth and level of education. Meningitis shock is Z score indicator based on district level mean as described in text. Linear time trends are
country specific time trends. ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 7: Effect of meningitis shock on infant mortality and number of total child vaccinations
in epidemic vs non-epidemic years
Infant Mortality Total Vaccinations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Meningitis shock −0.009 −0.009 0.309∗ 0.306∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.166) (0.166)
Epidemic year −0.055∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗ 0.453∗∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.216) (0.217)
Meningitis shock
x Epidemic year 0.009 0.009 −0.454∗ −0.443∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.261) (0.262)
Mean of outcome 0.374 0.374 3.674 3.674
Mother’s controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x year FE Yes No Yes No
Linear time trends No Yes No Yes
Observations 15,141 15,141 19,151 19,151
Notes: Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by district. Dependent variables
are child outcomes described in text from 8 African countries. Mother’s controls include mother’s age at birth and level of
education. Meningitis shock is Z score indicator based on district level mean as described in text. Linear time trends are
country specific time trends. ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗Significant at the
10 percent level.
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Table 8: First and second-stage estimates for interacted Share Muslim x Hajj instrument and comparisons with OLS
results for night light density
Panel A: First-Stage Estimates
Meningitis Shock
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share Muslim x Hajj −15.314∗∗∗ −15.314∗∗∗ −17.225∗∗∗ −17.225∗∗∗
(2.910) (2.910) (2.902) (2.902)
Epidemic year and Shock
x Year Interaction No No Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x year FE Yes No Yes No
Linear time trends No Yes No Yes
F-Stat of Excluded Instrument 27.69 27.69 35.23 35.23
Observations 1,114 1,114 1,114 1,114
Panel B: Second-Stage 2SLS vs OLS Estimates
Log Night Light Density
IV OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Meningitis shock −0.697∗ −0.620∗ −0.620∗ −0.065∗ −0.142∗∗ −0.142∗∗
(0.420) (0.364) (0.364) (0.036) (0.064) (0.064)
Epidemic year −0.956∗∗∗ −0.021 −0.916∗∗∗ 0.158
(0.099) (0.188) (0.083) (0.098)
Meningitis shock
x Epidemic year 0.725∗ 0.725∗ 0.171∗∗ 0.171∗∗
(0.431) (0.431) (0.082) (0.082)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Linear time trends No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1,141 1,141 1,141 1,141 1,141 1,141
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by district in all specifications. Meningitis shock is Z score indicator based on district level mean as
described in text. Log night light density outcomes described in text from 8 African countries from 1992 to 2008. Linear time trends are country specific time
trends. In Panel B, IV estimates from column (1) to (3) and OLS estimates from column (4) to (6). ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5
percent level, ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
46
Figure 10: World Bank project approval example snapshot
Table 9: Effect of meningitis shock and epidemic year on share of World Bank aid health vs
non-health projects approved
Health Project
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Meningitis shock 0.141 −0.039 −0.005
(0.134) (0.097) (0.133)
Epidemic year 0.824∗∗∗ 0.841∗∗∗ 0.910∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.090) (0.068)
Meningitis shock
x Epidemic year −0.121
(0.141)
Mean of outcome 0.126 0.164 0.164 0.164
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x year FE No No No No
Linear time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 278 213 213 213
Notes: Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by district. Dependent variable is
indicator for whether or not project is classified as a health project as described in text from study countries. There are not
enough observations to include a full range of country x year FE across all models. Results remain mostly unchanged when
separate district and year FE are included. Meningitis shock is Z score indicator based on district level mean as described
in text. Linear time trends are country specific time trends. ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5
percent level, ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 10: Effect of meningitis shock and epidemic year on amount committed and disbursed to World Bank aid projects
Panel A: Log Total Committed
Comm. Total Comm. Health Comm. Non-Health
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Meningitis shock −0.118 −0.092 −0.026
(0.254) (2.328) (2.172)
Epidemic year 0.383∗∗∗ −0.098 14.703∗∗∗ 16.219∗∗∗ −14.320∗∗∗ −16.317∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.298) (1.663) (1.197) (1.641) (1.942)
Meningitis shock x Epidemic year 0.770∗ −2.141 2.911
(0.418) (2.481) (2.283)
Mean of outcome 17.316 17.325 2.219 2.896 15.097 14.429
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x year FE No No No No No No
Linear time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 278 213 278 213 278 213
Panel B: Log Total Disbursed
Disb. Total Disb. Health Disb. Non-Health
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Meningitis shock 0.224 0.295 −0.071
(0.140) (2.449) (2.475)
Epidemic year 0.268∗∗ −0.145 14.809∗∗∗ 16.454∗∗∗ −14.541∗∗∗ −16.600∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.328) (1.665) (1.213) (1.626) (1.093)
Meningitis shock x Epidemic year 0.463 −2.563 3.026
(0.413) (2.598) (2.548)
Mean of outcome 17.175 17.241 2.302 3.035 14.873 14.206
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x year FE No No No No No No
Linear time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 269 204 269 204 269 204
Notes: Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by district. Dependent variables are log (1+ committed or disbursed amounts)
for health and non-health projects and for total projects as described in text from study countries. There are not enough observations to include a full range of country
x year FE across all models. Results remain mostly unchanged when separate district and year FE are included. Meningitis shock is Z score indicator based on district
level mean as defined in text. Linear time trends are country level time trends. ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗Significant at
the 10 percent level.
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Table 11: Effect of meningitis shock and epidemic year on independent rating of World Bank aid projects
IEG Outcome
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Meningitis shock 0.307
(0.466)
Epidemic year −2.247∗∗∗ 1.108∗∗∗ −2.386∗∗∗
(0.313) (0.350) (0.390)
Meningitis shock x Epidemic year 0.032
(0.512)
Health project −1.341∗∗∗ −0.344∗∗∗
(0.234) (0.098)
Epidemic year x Health project −3.239∗∗∗
(0.424)
Mean of outcome 3.977 3.977 3.977 4.029
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x year FE No No No No
Linear time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 301 301 301 204
Notes: Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by district. Dependent variables are
World Bank project independent evaluation group (IEG) ratings outcomes described in text from study countries. There are
not enough observations to include a full range of country x year FE across all models. Results remain mostly unchanged
when separate district and year FE are included. Meningitis shock is Z score indicator based on district level mean as
described in text. ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗Significant at the 10 percent
level.
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Table 12: Effect of meningitis shock on night light density outcomes by World Bank aid share of health projects, and
total committed and disbursed aid
Log Night Light Density
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Meningitis shock −0.094∗ −0.103∗ −0.103∗ 0.767 −0.153
(0.058) (0.061) (0.061) (1.578) (0.310)
Share health 0.055
(0.222)
Comm. health −0.130
(0.117)
Disb. health −0.131
(0.117)
Comm. total −0.033
(0.137)
Disb. total 0.005
(0.133)
Meningitis shock x Share health 0.188∗
(0.095)
Meningitis shock x Comm. health 0.009∗
(0.005)
Meningitis shock x Disb. health 0.009∗
(0.005)
Meningitis shock x Comm. total −0.045
(0.089)
Meningitis shock x Disb. total 0.007
(0.018)
Mean of outcome −3.056 −3.056 −3.056 −3.056 −3.056
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear time trends No No No No No
Observations 147 147 147 147 147
Notes: Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by district. Dependent variable is Log night light density described
in text from 8 African countries. Meningitis shock is Z score indicator based on district level mean as described in text. Results remain unchanged with
linear, country specific time trends. ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Figure 11: Top 5 World Bank health and non-health projects funded by project title in
epidemic and non-epidemic years
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Table 13: Effect of meningitis shock on economic activity in epidemic vs non-epidemic years, co-ethnic vs non-co-ethnic
with president districts, Niger
Log Night Light Density
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Meningitis shock −0.085∗ −0.085∗ −0.171∗∗ −0.085∗ −0.127∗∗ −0.203∗∗
(0.046) (0.049) (0.077) (0.045) (0.057) (0.085)
Epidemic year 0.567∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.087) (0.086)
Same ethnicity 0.001 −0.032 −0.033
(0.037) (0.035) (0.037)
Meningitis shock x Epidemic year 0.230∗∗ 0.221∗∗
(0.091) (0.085)
Meningitis shock x Same ethnicity 0.112∗∗ 0.094∗
(0.047) (0.048)
Mean of outcome −3.224 −3.224 −3.224 −3.224 −3.224 −3.224
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 578 578 578 578 578 578
Notes: Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by district. Dependent variable is log (0.01+ night light density) in Niger from
1992 to 2008. Meningitis shock and epidemic year variables as defined in text. Same ethnicity is if district shares same ethnicity as president. ∗∗∗Significant at the 1
percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 14: Split sample: Effect of meningitis shock on economic activity in epidemic vs
non-epidemic years, co-ethnic vs non-co-ethnic with president districts, Niger
Epidemic years Non-epidemic years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Meningitis shock 0.037 −0.010 −0.170∗∗ −0.234∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.042) (0.069) (0.091)
Same ethnicity −0.035 −0.085∗∗ 0.038 0.009
(0.033) (0.038) (0.056) (0.052)
Meningitis shock x Same ethnicity 0.100 0.201∗∗
(0.065) (0.082)
Mean of outcome −3.284 −3.284 −3.199 −3.199
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 170 170 408 408
Notes: Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by district. Dependent variable is log (0.01+ night
light density) in Niger from 1992 to 2008. Meningitis shock and epidemic year variables as defined in text. Same ethnicity is if district
shares same ethnicity as president. ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗Significant at the 10 percent
level.
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Table 15: Split sample: Effect of meningitis shock on infant mortality and child current weight and height outcomes in
epidemic vs. non-epidemic years, co-ethnic vs non co-ethnic with president districts, Niger
Epidemic years Non-Epidemic years
(Mortality) (Underweight) (Stunted) (Mortality) (Underweight) (Stunted)
Meningitis shock 0.044 0.295∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.020 −0.014 −0.017
(0.029) (0.169) (0.051) (0.028) (0.029) (0.024)
Same ethnicity −0.002 0.382∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ 0.019 −0.035 −0.037
(0.038) (0.165) (0.047) (0.040) (0.022) (0.023)
Meningitis shock x Same ethnicity −0.078∗ −0.372∗∗ −0.321∗∗∗ −0.040 0.028 0.078
(0.045) (0.174) (0.061) (0.059) (0.048) (0.047)
Mean of outcome 0.349 0.605 0.568 0.339 0.378 0.316
Mother’s controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,272 1,844 1,844 4,294 5,993 5,993
Notes: Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by district. Dependent variables are child outcomes as described in text from
Niger. Meningitis shock is Z score indicator based on district level mean as described in text. Mother’s controls include mother’s age at birth and level of education. Year
fixed effects are dropped for underweight and stunted outcomes in epidemic years due to not enough levels in the epidemic years. Results are unchanged for non-epidemic
years if drop year fixed effects. ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 16: Split sample: Effect of meningitis shock on child vaccination outcomes in epidemic vs non-epidemic years,
co-ethnic vs non co-ethnic with president districts, Niger
Epidemic years Non-Epidemic years
(Nos. Polio) (DPT) (Total) (Nos. Polio) (DPT) (Total)
Meningitis shock −0.202∗∗ −0.152 −0.301 0.086 0.091 0.178
(0.077) (0.072) (0.331) (0.082) (0.083) (0.186)
Same ethnicity −0.961∗∗∗ −1.148∗∗∗ −2.309∗∗∗ 0.041 0.043 0.142
(0.071) (0.060) (0.330) (0.115) (0.117) (0.275)
Meningitis shock x Same ethnicity 0.185∗∗ 0.143 0.233 −0.227 −0.202 −0.467
(0.088) (0.104) (0.330) (0.175) (0.173) (0.387)
Mean of outcome 1.422 1.362 3.843 0.933 0.946 2.620
Mother’s controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,059 2,049 2,016 8,870 8,865 8,825
Notes: Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by district. Dependent variables are child vaccination outcomes as described in text
from Niger. Meningitis shock is Z score indicator based on district level mean as described in text. Mother’s controls include mother’s age at birth and level of education.
Year fixed effects are dropped for vaccination outcomes in epidemic years due to not enough levels in the epidemic years. Results are unchanged for non-epidemic years
if drop year fixed effects. ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A1: Health expenditure statistics by region, 2016. Source: World Bank
Variable (2016) Benin Burkina Faso Cameroon Ghana Mali Niger Nigeria Togo Study mean Africa mean World mean
Health spending (% of GDP) 3.9 6.8 4.7 4.4 3.8 6.2 3.6 6.6 5 5.6 10
Health spending per capita (USD) 30 41 64 68 30 23 79 39 47 119 1,026
Government spending per capita (USD) 6 16 9 26 9 6 10 8 11 59 763
Government spending per capita (% of GDP) 0.8 2.7 0.6 1.7 1.2 1.5 0.5 1.3 1.1 1.3 7.4
Donor spending (% of health spending) 30 23 9 13 32 13 10 21 19 20
Out-of-pocket (% of health spending) 43 31 70 38 35 59 75 50 50 36 19
Out-of-pocket spending per capita (USD) 13 13 45 26 11 13 60 20 25 36 190
Out-of-pocket (% of GDP) 1.7 2.1 3.3 1.7 1.3 3.6 2.7 3.4 2.4 0.8 1.9
Figure A1: More health projects approved and more money committed and disbursed to
health projects overall during epidemic years, less to non-health projects. Difficult to target
health projects to high shock districts since locations decided ex-ante and health projects
are only 12% of aid projects. Redistribution of resources away from non-health projects to
health projects so less non-health projects and more health projects funded during epidemic
years.
Figure A2: Health aid projects started during the epidemic year are rated more poorly than
health aid projects started during the non-epidemic year
71
Figure A3: High shock districts that share the same ethnicity as the president see more
economic activity than non-coethnic districts. Children born in high shock co-ethnic districts
have less current underweight, stunting, more routine vaccine if born during epidemic year,
than non-coethnic districts. No ethnicity effects in non-epidemic year for child outcomes
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Table A2: Effect of meningitis shock on child mortality, current weight and height outcomes in epidemic years, co-ethnic
vs non co-ethnic with president districts, Niger
Mortality WFA z Underweight HFA z Stunted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Meningitis shock 0.044 −0.540∗∗ 0.295∗ −0.912∗ 0.302∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.208) (0.169) (0.543) (0.051)
Same ethnicity −0.002 −0.637∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗ −1.105∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.199) (0.165) (0.531) (0.047)
Meningitis shock x Same ethnicity −0.078∗ 0.682∗∗∗ −0.372∗∗ 0.975∗ −0.321∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.215) (0.174) (0.534) (0.061)
Mean of outcome 0.349 −2.244 0.605 −2.261 0.568
Mother’s controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,272 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,844
Notes: Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by district. Dependent variables are child outcomes described in
text from Niger. Meningitis shock is Z score indicator based on district level mean as described in text. Mother’s controls include mother’s age at birth
and level of education. Year fixed effects are dropped for underweight and stunted outcomes in epidemic years due to not enough levels in the epidemic
years. ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A3: Effect of meningitis shock on at birth (bcg, polio) vs non-at birth recommended (dpt, measles) vaccinations in
epidemic years, co-ethnic vs non co-ethnic with president districts, Niger
BCG Nos. Polio DPT Measles Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Meningitis shock −0.019 −0.202∗∗ −0.152∗∗ 0.047 −0.301
(0.061) (0.077) (0.106) (0.201) (0.173)
Same ethnicity −0.160∗∗ −0.961∗∗∗ −1.148∗∗∗ −0.170 −2.309∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.071) (0.107) (0.202) (0.330)
Meningitis shock x Same ethnicity −0.006 0.185∗∗ 0.143 −0.067 0.233
(0.070) (0.088) (0.104) (0.209) (0.330)
Mean of outcome 0.582 1.422 1.362 0.475 3.843
Mother’s controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,066 2,059 2,049 2,034 2,016
Notes: Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by district. Dependent variables are child vaccination outcomes
described in text from Niger. Meningitis shock is Z score indicator based on district level mean as described in text. Mother’s controls include mother’s
age at birth and level of education.Year fixed effects are dropped in the model due to not enough levels in the epidemic years. ∗∗∗Significant at the 1
percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A4: Effect of meningitis shock on infant mortality, current weight and height outcomes in non-epidemic years,
co-ethnic vs non co-ethnic with president districts, Niger
Mortality WFA z Underweight HFA z Stunted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Meningitis shock 0.024 −0.036 −0.014 0.012 −0.017
(0.027) (0.085) (0.027) (0.076) (0.024)
Same ethnicity 0.020 0.019 −0.035 0.148∗ −0.038
(0.041) (0.056) (0.022) (0.078) (0.023)
Meningitis shock x Same ethnicity −0.052 0.065 0.028 −0.191 0.077
(0.054) (0.248) (0.048) (0.256) (0.047)
Mean of outcome 0.339 −1.527 0.378 −1.309 0.316
Mother’s controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,294 5,993 5,993 5,993 5,993
Notes: Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by district. Dependent variables are child outcomes described in
text from Niger. Meningitis Shock is Z score indicator based on district level mean as described in text. Mother’s controls include mother’s age at birth
and level of education. ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A5: Effect of meningitis shock on at birth (bcg, polio) vs non-at birth recommended (dpt, measles) vaccinations in
non-epidemic years, co-ethnic vs non co-ethnic with president districts, Niger
BCG Nos. Polio DPT Measles Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Meningitis shock 0.003 0.086 0.091 0.007 0.178
(0.027) (0.082) (0.083) (0.031) (0.186)
Same ethnicity −0.008 0.041 0.043 0.054 0.142
(0.034) (0.115) (0.117) (0.046) (0.275)
Meningitis shock x Same ethnicity −0.059 −0.227 −0.203 −0.048 −0.467
(0.056) (0.175) (0.173) (0.050) (0.387)
Mean of outcome 0.460 0.933 0.946 0.284 2.620
Mother’s controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,858 8,870 8,865 8,832 8,825
Notes: Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by district. Dependent variables are child vaccination outcomes
described in text from Niger. Meningitis shock is Z score indicator based on district level mean as described in text. Mother’s controls include mother’s
age at birth and level of education. ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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A.2 Hajj Months, 1986-2008
Table A6: Hajj Months, 1986-2008
year hajj month
1 1986 august
2 1987 august
3 1988 july
4 1989 july
5 1990 july
6 1991 june
7 1992 june
8 1993 june
9 1994 may
10 1995 may
11 1996 april
12 1997 april
13 1998 april
14 1999 march
15 2000 march
16 2001 march
17 2002 february
18 2003 february
19 2004 february
20 2005 january
21 2006 january
22 2007 december
23 2008 december
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